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This paper aims to demonstrate that art history’s need for theory re-
mains relevant as the process of research advances. The paper rests on 
a case study from 1950s Hungary. Lajos Fülep composed an interesting 
opponent’s review on the 1955 doctoral thesis of Hungarian Renaissance 
scholar, Jolán Balogh. Fülep disapproves not of the lack of theory in Ba-
logh’s scholarly work, but of her theoretical encroachments without an 
awareness of a basic need for theorizing. Behind Fülep’s critical review 
there apparently stands the instinctive idea of a Lakatosian scientifi c 
research programme. If a historian of art does not pursue a research pro-
gramme, her work could easily lose its coherence and resonance. Without 
a research programme, there is no room left either for internal, or for 
external histories. One also has to consider, whether in the case of art, 
internal-normative history is governed by the problem of aesthetic value 
and whether the external-empirical history could be only formulated in 
these terms. If so, then a theory-unaware history of art would fail to 
reconstruct how different art-making individuals conceived of aesthetic 
properties. In line with this idea, the second part of this paper refl ects on 
the status of research programmes in art historical practice.
Keywords: Scientifi c research programmes, Hungarian intellectual 
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1. Problems and theses
A need for theory (NT) is one of art history’s most peculiar character-
istics and remains relevant as the process of research advances. To 
illustrate this, I will embark upon a seemingly trifl ing case study in 
20th century Hungarian scholarship on East-Central European Renais-
sance: Lajos Fülep’s (1974) critique of Jolán Balogh’s doctoral thesis 
(Balogh 1955) on a chapel of Esztergom in Hungary.
Lajos Fülep (1885–1970) was a regular but odd member of the ‘Sun-
day Circle’, a loose group of progressive-minded, philosophically ideal-
ist Hungarian intellectuals meeting at Béla Balázs’s apartment in Bu-
dapest between 1915 and 1919. The group was discussing a wide range 
of problems in philosophy, theory and history of art, literature, and 
cultural criticism. It was a free association of intellectuals under the 
leadership of Balázs himself, and of Georg Lukács, assessing the then-
actual problems of European culture. Although, when looking upon the 
Circle’s discussions reported by its visiting fellows, Lukács’s halo was 
evidently discernible, Fülep delivered a typical example of this group-
ing’s heterogenity. His intellectual pedigree was signifi cantly infl u-
enced by the pre-war years spent in Italy, had a critical approach to 
Geistesgeschichte, but was almost the single theorist of his generation 
that had never capitalized on his idealist backround to build up a genre 
of critical social thought (for details see Congdon 1991). This develop-
ment could have been motivated by the fact that Fülep never went 
to exile, he only undertook a self-imposed solitude in rural Hungary, 
while after the second world war he contributed to the vast project of 
writing the history of Hungarian art by his managerial qualities and 
his sweeping theoretical insights.
Jolán Balogh (1900–1988), coming from a different generation of 
young art historians, has been a student of Budapest art history pro-
fessor Antal Hekler. Between 1926–28 she was an intern at Hungary’s 
freshly established cultural institute in Rome, carried out a vast activ-
ity in Austrian and Italian archives and, afterwards, became a decent 
and acknowledged expert of Renaissance art and culture in Hungary.1 
Without entering the minutiae of this complicated history, it is impor-
tant to remark that Balogh’s apprenticeship in art history was made 
in the interwar years giving a fresh start to Italo-Hungarian cultural 
exchange, and to the re-invetion of an age-long tradition of Hungarian 
Ranaissance.2 Her seminal work in reconstructing the Intalianate as-
pects of 15th–16th century Hungary constituted the basis of her doctoral 
1 For a relevant token of her activity see Balogh (1975).
2 Such as her master, Hekler, Balogh was working with the hypothesis that 
Renaissance was no periodic occurrence in Hungarian Art History (thriving for only 
good 40 years) but had a parallel evolution with Northern Italian tendencies from the 
late 14th century to the end of the 16th. A synoptic view on Hungarian advances in art 
history of the Renaissance, the different Hungarian schools of broader Renaissance 
studies, and, respectively, Balogh position in these schools has been delivered by 
Born (2015).
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thesis in the mid-1950s. This is the point where her academic agenda 
intersected with that of Fülep’s.
In his critique Fülep disapproves not of the lack of theory in Ba-
logh’s scholarly work, but of her theoretical encroachments, and some-
times even of her theory-laden conclusions without the awareness of 
a basic need for theorizing. Without such an awareness, the message 
of a historical work would be inconspicuous. Fülep’s critique clearly 
introduces a meta-theoretical tier: what is the envisaged level of theory 
in historical research in general and why is it needed? This call “into 
question both the practice [of art history] and fragmented theory [also 
known as: NT]” (Elkins 1988: 375).
Fülep’s critical review is led by an instinctive, not clearly elaborated 
idea of a scientifi c research programme (RP) in art history. According to 
this, if an historian of art pursues no research programme or, to invoke 
Imre Lakatos’ words, a normative methodology, her work would lose 
coherence and, respectively, the whole enterprise is liable to forfeit its 
scholarly importance. Without a research programme, there is no room 
left either for internal-normative, or for external-empirical histories. 
One also has to consider, whether in the case of art, internal histories 
would be assessing the issue of aesthetic value, whether aesthetic val-
ue defi nes the choice of normative problems for a historian and, accord-
ingly, whether aesthetic value yields the framework for considering 
the socio-psychological circumstances in which works of art emerge. 
If so, then a theory-free, or theory-laden but theory-unaware history 
of art would fail to properly reconstruct the relation of normative and 
empirical histories of art. In this way, it would be unclear how differ-
ent art-making individuals, who were coming from different historical, 
social, and material circumstances, conceived of aesthetic value and of 
the basic (or extended)3 spectrum of aesthetic properties. Accordingly, 
Balogh’s work, notwithstanding with its clear erudite nature, could be 
labelled historically “blind” (in the sense of the Kantian dictum, and its 
paraphrase provided by Lakatos).
In any case, it is useful to ponder introducing the concept of re-
search programmes into the study of art history. With this, I do not 
mean to suggest that no research programme had been ever used in art 
historical practice. I rather want to consider whether Lakatosian con-
ceptual tools could add an extra layer to this very practice of relevant 
refl ection. I believe the answer is yes. Refl ection on doing art history 
under the auspices of a certain set of theories would, assumedly, tell 
us something about their quality. If these theories are research pro-
grammes, then their quality will revolve around the two markers of the 
“progressive”, respectively, of the “degenerative”. Research pogrammes 
are progressive when the normative-theoretical growth of the chosen 
problems could anticipate the empirical growth of the research process. 
If, to anticipate this empirical growth, too many auxiliary hypotheses 
has to added to the initial theoretical framework, then research pro-
3 For details see Levinson (2005).
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grammes will slowly begin to degenerate (Lakatos 1980: 102). At the 
same time, it seems that one could doubt whether the notions of pro-
gression and degeneration are (or are in an usual way) key features of 
research programmes in art history. I will come back to this topic later.
Finally, I will not, in this text, give a more elaborate taxonomy of art 
historical and meta-historical genres than their experts (Elkins 1988; 
see also Iversen and Melville 2010 and Verstegen 2013) have already 
conveyed, nor will I refl ect on the many differences of the history of 
science and the history of art by emphasizing the role of the visual in 
the latter (Danto 2014). What is at stake here is the question of what 
exactly makes an art historical investigation scientifi c, or how could 
art history achieve its scientifi c goals. One conclusive answer is that 
this goal should be achieved by deploying viable research programmes 
in art historical practice and, probably, also in refl ecting on goals and 
scopes of art history itself.4
2. Fülep’s case with Balogh
Balogh’s book presents at least fi ve important theses. Two of them are 
explicitly formulated, while the other three need a careful reconstruc-
tive work. Balogh’s explicit claims are:
(1) The Bakócz chapel (henceforth: Chapel) is a salient example of 
Tuscan, and a unique token of sacral Cinquecento architecture 
beyond the Alps. It is an admirable piece of construction: it is 
perfectly proportionate; uses only types of local marble for the 
entire inner decoration; its former bronze dome with relief or-
nate constituted its differentia specifi ca, which was unparalleled 
even in Italy at the time;
(2) It is a direct heir to the space-shaping ideal represented by 
Brunelleschi’s Cappella Pazzi in Florence.
These fi rst two points are mixed with three implicit, but equally im-
portant theses:
(3) The Chapel was a highly expensive local Renaissance edifi ce 
started and fi nished in an age of fi nancial crisis and economic 
depression, when all the pillars of the medieval Hungarian state 
were in decline;
(4) It successfully survived four sieges, a stark denominational 
shift, and one complete structure relocation in the 19th century 
for “its beauty defl ected Barbarism” (Balogh 1955: 17);
4 The concept of research programmes is ab ovo self-refl ecting. While one 
considers the history of science through the lens of confl icting research programs 
the historiography deployed would also confl ict with other kinds of historiographies 
in determining the basic values of inquiry. To cite Lakatos: “The methodology 
of scientifi c research programmes constitutes, like any other methodology, a 
historiographical research programme. A historian that accepts this methodology as 
a guide will look in history for rival research programmes [...]” (Lakatos 1980: 114).
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(5) This survival was facilitated mainly not by the supreme techni-
cal knowledge of its artisans, but by its aesthetic value.
Fülep’s critique was clearly ignited by the number and importance of 
such implicit theses. Fülep calls Balogh to account for not delivering a 
“synthentic-theoretic outlook” of the era she investigates. Without this 
“general outlook”, the “air of the epoch” would not transpire. Balogh’s 
work, Fülep says, is painfully documented and scholarly accurate, but 
it fails to picture “the historical reality that produced the artworks”, 
respectively “what is essential to understand the historical determina-
tions conditioning its emergence” (Fülep 1974: 457, 461, 670). Fülep 
misses, in Balogh’s book, the “representation of the milieu”, i.e. the 
social environment that lets the artwork emerge. On a fi nal account, 
Balogh’s work conveys no “Geistesgeschichtlich” framework (just a few 
promising traces of a fragmented theory) which could be the warrant of 
understanding the concrete, singular artwork. She could be regarded 
as an astute researcher, who collects all the traceable facts then neatly 
presenting them it in kind of a catalogue raisonné without providing 
the bigger picture the story would require.
3. Methodology, theory, and Lakatosian RP
I endorse the view that one can have an elaborate methodology of treat-
ing and unravelling the aspects of artistic creation, without having a 
complex theory that could be applied everywhere, that is, a framework 
to accommodate all the facts discovered. I will use “theory” here in a 
minimal sense, as a selective point of view. A minimal need for theory 
is, therefore, a need for a selective point of view.
 Theory, as a selective point of view, had an important role in 
the philosophy of historiography. In his classical essay, Karl Popper 
pleaded for a theoretically informed way of historical inquiry: He wrote, 
“[…] there can be no history without a point of view. Like the natural 
sciences history must be selective unless it is to be choked by a fl ood of 
poor and unrelated material. The attempt to follow causal chains […] 
has little interest for us. […] The only way out of this diffi culty is to 
introduce a preconceived selective point of view […] that is to write a 
history which interests us.” (Popper 1957: 150).
One of the most creative appropriations of this idea goes back to 
Imre Lakatos. At the beginning, Lakatos interpreted the Kantian dic-
tum (“history of science without philosophy of science is blind” (Lakatos 
1980: 102)), to emphasize the constant interaction of a history of ideas 
with the history of implementing them. Afterwards he applied this 
twin-focused analysis to Popper’s diagnosis on the selectivity criterion 
of writing history:
Some historians look for the discovery of hard facts, inductive generaliza-
tions, others for bold theories and crucial negative experiments, yet oth-
ers for great simplifi cations, or for progressive and degenerating problem 
shifts; all of them have some theoretical ‘bias’. This bias, of course, may 
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be obscured by an eclectic variation of theories or by theoretical confusion: 
but neither eclecticism nor confusion amounts to an atheoretical outlook. 
(Lakatos 1980: 120)
Whereas research programmes are not theories, but a series of inter-
connected theories that have the goal of constituting scientifi c objectiv-
ity, Lakatos would have only been speaking about a series of theories, 
which are implemented from a selective point of view. Accordingly, the 
minimal need for a research programme proves itself to be a minimal 
need for a selectivity-driven series of theories, which have the goal of 
constituting scientifi c objectivity.
4. Towards the concept of research programs 
in art history. Brief comparison of Fülep and Lakatos
I think that there are more than prima facie similarities between the posi-
tions of Fülep and Lakatos. At the same time, Fülep’s stances are clearly 
less mature and less elaborate.5 In what follows, I present the blueprint of 
their parallel agendas and I do so by staking out four similarities (S) and 
two differences (D) between them. The last two will, hopefully, outline 
how a research programme in art history should be understood.
(S1) Inner history (intellectual history) and outer history (social his-
tory) are complementary (Lakatos 1980: 102). Rational recon-
struction of this inner discourse enhances the relevance of cer-
tain empirical data.
(S2) Inner history is primary in understanding what the specifi city 
of the discourse is. Therefore, “aesthetic value” is primary to the 
(n.b.: necessary) outer conditions under which aesthetic value 
emerged (Fülep 1974: 458).
(S3) There is no historical discourse without a communal theoretical 
bias (Lakatos 1980: 15, 120). In addition, it is easier to admit 
one’s minimal theoretical commitments, then to let them return 
unconsciously (Fülep 1971: 23).
(S4) Therefore, one must impute to art history a hard core of theory 
and a positive heuristic, “which defi nes problems and delimits 
anomalies” and, accordingly, outlines a plan how the integrity of 
this theory should be kept.
(D1) As already mentioned, there is at least one crucial concern about 
the decisive status of progression and degeneration in art his-
torical research programmes.6 Lakatos says, if we consider the 
5 Their similarities could be traced back to a common Hungarian intellectual 
background. The general idea, that an inner, intellectual and an outer, social history 
should be interconnected, were both emphasized in the young Georg Lukács’s 
writings, respectively in Lakatos’ view on the development of scientifi c knowledge. 
For the outline of such a comparison see Demeter (2008).
6 For the role of progressive and degenerative problem shifts in aesthetics see 
Nanay (2017: esp. Chapter 4). This is, to my knowledge, the most complex essay on 
framing aesthetics through Lakatosian concepts. A programme is thus degenerating 
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research programme to be the “unit of mature science” (Lakatos 
1980: 179), then we will also have to stipulate the conditions of 
appraising them. In pursuing a research programme, we regu-
larly modify some elements of the inner history to protect the 
hard core of the theorem, and to keep in balance the normative 
and empirical side of research. The hard core is a limited set of 
main ideas that our research is built upon. If these ideas need 
to be repeatedly multiplied to yield a minimal empirical growth, 
then it is very likely that our research programme has started 
to degenerate.
But, Lakatos is mainly committed to analyse the evolution of natural 
science. A research programme in the natural sciences also has to keep 
the balance of inner-normative and outer-empirical histories. If the em-
pirical growth is staggering, then a modifi cation of the inner-normative 
hard core will constitute a legitimate move to improve its performance. 
Such a research programme could be theoretically progressive if “each 
[such] modifi cation leads to new unexpected predictions” and could be 
empirically progressive “if at least some of these predictions are corrob-
orated” (Lakatos 1980: 179). The status of (corroborated) predictions 
and of the ability to explain new facts both depend upon the central 
role, which Lakatos confers to cognitive value.
when adding too many ad-hoc hypotheses to protect the hard core of the theory. Nanay 
clearly allows for degenerativity and progression in theories of art, because he is 
less worried about the methodological distinction I still make between cognitive and 
aesthetic value. His quest for a new discourse on aesthetically relevant properties, 
clearly, calls for no such distinction. Alethically relevant properties yield a difference 
in our experience, and are usually more accurate than the, so Nanay, sometimes 
puzzling notions of beauty, ugliness, serene, moving, and sublime (Nanay 2017: 
70). More accurate and straightforward (Nanay 2017: 71) concepts can multiply the 
number of fruitful analyses in the complicated relation of the perceptive and the 
aesthetic regarding the whole universe of artistic production. The difference in our 
experience is thus delivered by new evaluative and critical practices helping us to 
understand aesthetic phenomena: “Hence, if a research programme in aesthetics 
is consistent with and can explain our critical and evaluative practice, we have 
some (not necessarily conclusive) reason to consider it to be progressive. If it can’t 
do that, it is likely to be degenerative.” (Nanay 2017: 78) Something very similar is 
stated a few pages later: “A research programme is likely to be progressive and not 
degenerative if it can explain new phenomena and open up new research directions.” 
(Nanay 2017: 83). If progression or degenaration hinges on introducing new and more 
accurate evaluations and critiques of the matter discussed, then one will instantly 
comply to the thesis that art historical research could also be both degenerative and 
progressive. But, if this also includes the acceptance of a second thesis on the less 
accurate nature of aesthetic properties, one would also beg to differ. Classical pieces 
of art could be accurately grasped by their aesthetical properties for they have an 
outer history of conforming and opposing to regularly changing standards of beauty 
and ugliness. How to hold and, respectively, how to lose the aesthetic property of 
beauty would be a question underlying research programs that have not overspent 
their budget. They are not cognitively compelling but still evaluatively very rich. As 
long as art history can raise interest in this traditional discourse through a research 
program, it would not have to be replaced.
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According to these principles, predictive-explanatory progression guar-
antees the sustainability of research programmes in the natural scienc-
es. But, I think it would be more accurate to adopt a different agenda 
in specifying the sustainability of art historical research programmes. 
I think that, in order to be sustainable, art historical research pro-
grammes need only to just be viable, where viability means to be ef-
fi cient in arousing interest in equally old and new problems and values 
by not necessarily demanding epistemic novelty.
Viable research programmes in art history are concerned less with 
making predictions, because they are less concerned with cognitive 
value. They usually make inquiries into how the cooperation of art-
ists and commissioners succeeded to materialize seemingly abstract 
aesthetic qualities. This is why progressive or degenerating problem 
shifts could be unintelligible to art historians. So long as inner history 
usually refl ects aesthetic value, its purport would depend neither on 
epistemic novelty, nor on the success of predictions. This informs us 
about a second major difference between scientifi c and art historical 
research programmes.
(D2) Lakatos’ concept of heuristic power also remains problematic here. 
If one investigates the history of materialized aesthetic properties, 
it will be less important how many ensuing new facts could be 
produced, regardless of these fact’s “capacity to explain their refu-
tations” (Lakatos 1980: 52). While an art historian constitutes a 
normative-theoretical history she is less focused on the amount of 
new facts. She is, or has to be, concerned with the most plausible, 
and suffi ciently interesting connection between aesthetic proper-
ties and the existing artworks refl ecting these properties.
But let us just imagine a case, where epistemic novelty keeps its cen-
tral role. That is, let us imagine a case where, in the context of predict-
ability, the issue of new data still remains highly relevant. However, 
new data could be defi ned in, at least, three different, ways: (a) as em-
pirical information or new sources of empirical information; (b) as new 
diagnoses of a given constellation (c) as new evaluative and critical 
practices pertaining to a set of phenomena. But none of them could, 
strictly speaking, be predicted. No such new data could be predicted to 
occur unexpectedly, let alone repeatedly or regularly in a determinate 
future. There are no new art historical discoveries that are guaran-
teed to be perfectly in line with the initial conditions reconstructed by 
specially trained scholars. No theorist of art historical practice could 
predict which relevant stone-fragment of the original façade an archae-
ological excavation would reveal. She can only suggest that a decisive 
fi nding—without determining its exact condition, shape, or colour—is 
very likely to occur.
If a research program is a normative methodology that fulfi ls the 
basic need for coupling inner and outer histories in art historical re-
search, then it has no need to prove itself as progressive or as degen-
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erating, for it does not claim to be able to predict the future, or if it 
does so, in a very limited sense, something like: it can foreshadow that 
new evaluations of the matter will be available soon, although the ex-
act markers of that novelty are still uncertain (c); it can conjecture 
that new proofs will be given, if the researcher follows a given direc-
tion (b), or, and most possibly, the research will be more sensitive to 
phenomena resembling the case that has just been studied (a). This 
sensitivity-conditioned enterprise could equally be positive and nega-
tive. Positive, if it facilitates interesting discoveries or evaluations of 
them and, respectively, negative, if it makes this evaluation too easy, 
schematic and, consequently, uninteresting.7
What would constitute, in conclusion, a viable research program for 
the practice of art history? A good recipe is joining inner and outer his-
tory so that it would rouse interest in the scholarly achievement. But 
there is one more factor that determines our defi nition.
If we defi ne the practice of art history by the conditions under which 
it could be classifi ed as a scholarly achievement, we have to stipulate 
these conditions, partly, as conditions of resonance. The quality of a 
scholarly achievement could be evaluated according to the level of its 
intellectual resonance, or to put it other words according to how it reso-
nates with different people and communities over time. Sociologically 
speaking, the extent of the population constituting the reception of an 
intellectual work (also an inquiry in the history of art) is crucial to the 
evaluation of this very work. If an intellectual product aroused a sense 
of urgency in the public and if it was widely received and discussed, it 
would have more chance to survive as a constituent of the general dis-
course on a certain topic. It would thus have a far better chance to be 
evaluated as scholarly relevant, disputable or even thought-provoking. 
But what conveys those intensional criteria that could trigger an exten-
sive reception? It depends on the nature of the matter disputed. But, 
indifferent of this specifi c nature, intensional criteria have to meaning-
fully refl ect the characteristic position of the historian concerning the 
relation of “intellectual” and “social” history. Art historians usually tell 
the story of the ubiquitous and necessary outer conditions under which 
artworks, bearing an aesthetic property, have been made.
Accordingly, RP in art history is determined by two factors (a) a 
(normative) theoretical framework to steer the research process, and 
(b) an (instructive-sociological) picture that, properly drafted, makes 
its fi ndings accessible to a learned audience with a relevant, but not 
7 This resembles the way Clifford Geertz found place for the concept of prediction 
in his methodology of thick description. A cultural anthropologist could not strictu 
sensu predict the occurrence of phenomena. She can—by using a semi-fl edged form 
of clinical inference—diagnose them or, „the very most”, anticipate that they are 
very likely to happen (Geertz 2000: 26 ). This is due to the fact that cultural sciences 
could not generalize across different cases but can only use a more general idea in 
the particular case themselves: “The essential task of theory building here is not to 
codify abstract regularities, but to make thick description possible, not to generalize 
across cases but to generalize within them” (Geertz 2000: 26).
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identical form of scholarly expertise. But, at any rate, great scientifi c 
achievements (Lakatos 1980: 110) in art history are research programs 
because they can accommodate a larger spectrum of problems, answers, 
and various historical cases of unpredictability.
5. Framing the case of Balogh. 
Possible research programmes
In the example conveyed by Balogh, we can discern at least two viable 
research programmes. These programmes have otherwise no exclusiv-
ity. Different possible ways could be also pursued unless they deploy a 
positive heuristic and rouse interest in the scholarly public, while the 
research programmes, which are discussed in what follows, could be 
easily abolished if they prove themselves unviable.
5.1 Questioning the Prosperity Theory
Prosperity Theory states that the incontestable achievements of high 
Renaissance art could be understood against the backdrop of local eco-
nomic wealth (Burke 1986: 37–38). This was deemed to be wrong by 
Robert Sabatino Lopez at the beginning of the 1950s, although we have 
no evidence that Balogh knew about these critical assessments of his 
Italian-American Colleague, or about the outlines of such an RP in art 
history.
Lopez’s main point consisted in the remark that humanistic culture 
was a form of investment, even if not a purely economic one. In high 
Renaissance and Humanism “culture […] tended to become the high-
est symbol of nobility, the magic password which admitted a man or a 
nation to the elite group. Its value rose at the very moment that the 
value of land fell. Its returns mounted when commercial interest rates 
declined. Statesmen who had tried to build up their power and prestige 
by enlarging their estates now vied with one another to gather works 
of art” (Lopez 1959). Some distinguished statesmen of the Renaissance 
era in Italy, like the mighty Lorenzo de Medici received their “halo 
of respectability” through their patronage of art and not through the 
sustainability of their business matters. As far as we know, Balogh 
traced a similar path in her naïve treatment of Tamás Bakócz’s role as 
a patron, which makes this core idea useful for the outer history it can 
adumbrate. When a surplus of power could not have been generated by 
the rulers of a certain community (e.g. by Lorenzo de Medici in Flor-
ence or by Tamás Bakócz in Hungary) or through economic excellence, 
then it was granted by investment in symbolic means. The outer his-
tory would tell us how the patrons themselves were conscious of this 
endeavour of investing in symbolic means and how they managed to 
implement them under different conditions. If this research program 
succeeds, it could also cast new light on the historical role of East-Cen-
tral European patrons: they were lagging behind their Western col-
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leagues probably not due to their economic inferiority, but due to the 
different consequences of their endeavours to acquire symbolic power.
5.2. The Wölffl inian way
Some recent work on Heirich Wölffl in’s Principles of Art History have 
revealed the twofold importance of his contribution to a formalist meth-
od of art history (Gaiger 2015). The fi rst issue concerns the so-called 
history of vision claim, while the other assesses the parallel issue of 
the notions of pleasure. The pairs of concepts governing a discourse 
on the history of vision are necessarily coupled with another history of 
decorative appreciation:
It is dangerous to speak only of certain «states of the eye» by which concep-
tion is determined: every artistic conception is, of its very nature, organized 
according to certain notions of pleasure. Hence our […] pairs of concepts 
have an imitative and a decorative signifi cance. (Wölffl in 1959: 16) 
To understand this stance on principles of art history, one need not be 
excessively knowledgeable in the historiography of the discipline. But 
a short excursus on Alois Riegl’s conception on the scientifi c status of 
art history could be of some use.
Riegl was loudly concerned with the infl ated scholarly meaning of 
technical inquiries. In his ironic assessment of then-contemporary re-
search in applied arts, he remarked that, according to recent scholar-
ship, all forms of production in art industry could be treated as the 
outcome of specifi c technical conditions and, accordingly, could be criti-
cized as such. But to which ends does one act when praising or scolding 
the technical conditions of applied arts? Does it have to reemphasize 
the initial idea, that art industry is clearly controlled by the level of 
technical development (Riegl 1924: vii)? The same could be asked about 
the psychological path to art. What is the scholarly gain of describing 
art as the world of artefacts produced by artists, who have a certain set 
of inner (creative) capacities? What is the scholarly gain of stating that 
the artists are in good or bad command of their truly existing abilities 
or that they are adept or not adept at doing something? Riegl rather 
pursued the goal of scientifi c art history, which lacked reductive or cir-
cular argumentations and, therefore, formulated the question: what 
fulfi ls these scientifi c needs? His answer was a synthetic inquiry into 
the reconstruction of artistic volition (Kunstwollen), which is the recon-
struction of what art producing agents wanted to express through their 
activities by opposing technical and psychological burdens (Riegl 1927: 
9) Riegl’s expressly corrective-scientifi c goals were equally endorsed by 
his advocates (e.g. Benjamin) and opponents (e.g. Gombrich), regard-
less of how they came to terms with Kunstwollen. Without entering 
into a heavily laden discussion of the topic, I just hope to signal that 
the same question motivated Wölffl in’s Principles: I wish just to resolve 
what the science of art history is and which methods it should deploy to 
secure the specifi city of the aesthetic. The answer emerges bluntly. The 
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envisaged scientifi c status of art history has to be provided by a care-
ful analysis of historically changing visual capacities. But, this analy-
sis needs to be underscored by a parallel history of the sensitivity for 
beauty. This latter history clarifi es how artists of different generations 
were reassessing the works of others. When artists of a certain period 
have found the works of their predecessors’ worth discussion, reconsti-
tution, re-enactment, or reproduction, they have also laid bare a cer-
tain sensitivity for the aesthetic properties of these works. To settle the 
most pertinent regularities of these histories should be the main task 
of an art scholar: “[…] men have at all times seen what they wanted to 
see, that does not exclude the possibility that a law remains operative 
throughout all change. To determine this law would be a central prob-
lem, the central problem of a history of art” (Wölffl in 1959: 17).
We can also fabricate a viable research programme if we put this 
thought into effect and analyse the historically changing sensitivity for 
aesthetic properties in the works of others. Along these lines we could 
have some robust tools to deal with the issue of how works of art could 
survive the most problematic ages. Mutatis mutandis, we will under-
stand how the Chapel has managed to survive. This case of the Chapel is 
modelling a key aspect of the autonomy of art, that is, the historical de-
velopment of the conception of beauty. Following this reading, the long-
lasting success of the Chapel could be understood as a history of how it 
was adapted to various views and conceptions on being “decorative”. To 
put it differently, in various ages there were various ways of “longing for 
beauty”, and some distinguished artworks were able to similarly fulfi l 
these changing endeavours and to connect artist of different pedigrees 
and sensibilities. The Chapel proved itself worth re-assessment in differ-
ent ages and among different social and material conditions.
***
Through both of these examples, we can make the above-mentioned 
features of art historical research programmes understandable. One of 
these features is the basic conundrum of predictability. Let us see how 
this all works here.
In the case of high Renaissance Hungarian commissioners of art-
works, one could not predict that three more tokens of investment in 
symbolic means of power would be discovered. No one could necessarily 
state that fi nancers kept on commissioning marble chapels since they 
were unable to purchase marble quarries. In this case, as in the vast 
majority of such cases, it is enough to be clear and consequent in join-
ing inner and outer histories. The rate of symbolic investments in cul-
ture rises when economic growth is on the wane. This is the inner core, 
which is exemplifi ed by various historical cases (that prove or refute 
it), that will conjure a viable research program. It is important though, 
not to generalize across data recorded before, but rather to use inner 
history as a useful tool in understanding these discoveries.
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The position of predictability in the Wölffl inian programme is very 
similar. We cannot foresee that a highly acknowledged piece of Renais-
sance architecture will survive another siege or another structural 
relocation thanks to the “beauty” it is endowed with, but we can con-
jecture that the pleasure it causes could be a serious topic of discus-
sion when locals would have to decide whether keeping, destroying, or 
rebuilding it. If the physical existence of an artwork is closely attached 
to a discussion on its aesthetic properties (which it can possess or not 
possess), one could deploy at least a research programme, which joins 
the history of ideas with the history of wanting them materialized. This 
programme would prove itself viable if new ways of joining inner and 
outer histories kept the interest in it alive.8
6. Conclusions
After careful reconstruction and reconsideration, it can be concluded 
that Balogh’s work can be employed to infer in both a descriptive and 
a normative manner. But, due to a complete lack of clearly formulated 
viable research programmes, her theses are still relevant while less de-
fensible against refuting facts and concurrent (i.e. coherent) research 
programmes.
As a sociological corollary, without research programmes, art his-
torical works have less chances to be received, discussed, and, conse-
quently, will be unable to enter a wider community. To prevent this, 
one has to redeem art history’s basic need for theorizing. In addition, 
the constitution of viable research programmes puts historians of art 
in an even better posture. By deploying these programmes, historians 
would be able to join both characteristic sides of art scholarship: an en-
deavour for facts and, respectively, the predilection for well-known but 
sometimes vaguely presented aesthetic properties. One cannot prove 
the specifi city of the aesthetic, if its values are not checked against the 
changing material conditions under which they were put into practice. 
Viable research programmes could be extremely helpful in fulfi lling 
this task.
8 More recent scholarly work on the Chapel has never reached a wider audience 
probably due to lacking a viable research programme. But, it has never forsaken 
theory in general. E.g. Miklós Horler (1990) followed a decent Marxist interpretation 
of Renaissance man’s urge to create or to fi nance creating artworks (see Heller 1978). 
However, to render this theoretical commitment into a viable programme, he would 
have had to couple inner history informed by the Marxist theory of estrangement 
with an adequately reconstructed outer history. In other words, he would have had 
to trace the historically changing patterns of dealing with this very phenomenon of 
estrangement, which he did not.
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